Realignments must to end Iraq-Syria civil war
June 14, 2014, 7:30 am

With the fall of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the twin civil wars in Iraq and Syria have merged into a single conflict. Large parts of both northern and eastern Syria and northwest Iraq now play host to ISIS’ forces, who hope to use those areas as a base from which to attack the capitals of Damascus and Baghdad. The carnage that has left as many as 150,000 Syrians and perhaps 20,000 Iraqis dead since 2011 is likely to intensify.

Despite the worldwide alarm over ISIS’ advances, however, the reality is that the organization, for all its ruthlessness and despite its newly captured arms, does not have sufficient muscle either to topple the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria or to oust Nouri al-Maliki’s government in Baghdad. In Syria, Assad’s forces – aided by Iran, Russia, and thousands of combatants from Lebanon’s Hezbollah – have been steadily making gains against the armed opposition, including ISIS, there. In Iraq, meanwhile, despite the collapse and ragged retreat of Iraq’s armed forces in Mosul and other cities, Maliki’s government is likely to push back in brutal fashion, recapturing ground from ISIS with the help of its regular army, a range of paramilitary Shiite militiamen, covert (and perhaps overt) help from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and – ironically – military aid and perhaps air support from the United States.

To be sure, ISIS is a dangerous organization with a bloody record behind it, from mass executions and beheadings to the forcible imposition of harsh and repressive political and social measures in areas it controls. It began, perhaps a decade ago, as a group calling itself Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which drew support from Iraqi Sunnis angry at the U.S. invasion and the installation of a sectarian Shiite government in Baghdad. As it evolved, transforming itself into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, it alienated much of its local support, and Al Qaeda officials in Pakistan condemned it for its wanton killings of Muslims, Sunnis and Shiites alike. By 2012, ISIS emerged as a leading actor in the civil war in Syria, and it intensified a wave of car bombings and suicide attacks in Iraq, too, setting up paramilitary camps in remote areas of Anbar province and, in January, seizing control of the war-torn city of Fallujah, which it still holds. Its surprise assault on Mosul this month routed Iraq’s forces in the north, and since then ISIS commanders have threatened to attack the Shiite heartland of Iraq, including the twin holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.

But, like many civil wars – including the conflict in Afghanistan, which is largely a proxy war pitting Pakistan against India and Iran – the Iraq-Syria civil war across what used to be called the Fertile Crescent is a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is a complex struggle, both a sectarian one that pits the Shiite Iranians against the Sunni Saudis, and a clash of state power and hard-core national interests. In Syria, Shiite Iran is the main pillar of support for Assad’s government, many of whose leaders are members of the Alawite faith, an offshoot of Shiism, fighting an almost entirely Sunni rebel force that including ISIS, other Al Qaeda-linked forces, dozens of other Sunni Islamist militia, and other, more moderate Sunni forces, variously backed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and powerful, private Sunni financiers in Kuwait. And in Iraq, Iran is a powerful backer of Maliki’s sectarian Shiite government, while Saudi Arabia – sullenly hostile toward Maliki and his Iranian backers, and bitterly resentful of the United States for helping to empower Iraq’s Shiite majority – has close ties to Iraqi Sunni tribesmen and anti-Maliki forces through Iraq’s north and west.

Yet the rise of ISIS presents a grave challenge to both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and that provides a glimmer of hope for a solution. If the Syria-Iraq civil war is to be resolved, therefore, that solution must start with détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Syria, that means that Tehran and Riyadh will have to work toward an accommodation between Assad and/or elements of his government and key segments of the Syrian armed opposition, while working together to isolate Al Qaeda, ISIS and the extremists. And in Iraq, it means that Tehran and Riyadh – along with Turkey, which has important influence with both Sunnis and Kurds there – must work hard to prod, cajole and persuade their allies inside Iraq to settle their main differences and set up a true government of national unity in Baghdad.

For Washington, the Iraq-Syria civil war and the challenge from ISIS will provide a severe test of President Obama’s legendary cool-headedness and of America’s ability to engage in patient, creative diplomacy. Because of America’s investment of blood and treasure during the 2003-2011 war in Iraq, Obama is under tremendous pressure to reengage militarily in Iraq – whether it means U.S. airstrikes, drone attacks, stepped-up military aid to Baghdad, intelligence sharing, or even U.S. military advisers – and to get far more heavily involved now in support of Syria’s anti-Assad forces. But it’s hard to see any justification for greater American military involvement in either Iraq or Syria.

First, in both countries the war will only end with a political solution, not a military one. It is, of course, possible that the standoff will continue in both countries, with thousands dying monthly in the meat-grinder of civil war. But neither side is capable of achieving a military victory in either country. That’s especially true in Iraq, where Maliki has created deep divisions, alienating Sunnis by excluding them from power and persecuting leading Sunni political leaders, hollowing out and weakening Iraq’s armed forces by replacing disfavored generals with Maliki’s lackeys, and relying on whipped-up Shiite sectarian political support, including backing from Shiite militias and pro-Iranian paramilitary groups.

Second, despite ISIS’s horrific record and past links to Al Qaeda, there’s no reason to believe that ISIS has any plans, or any capability, to attack the United States and other Western targets. Unlike Osama bin Laden’s group, ISIS is entirely focused on Syria and Iraq, and none of its leaders have expressed any desire to engage in international terrorism. However, were the United States to attack ISIS militarily, especially via F-16s, cruise missiles, or drones, that could change, and ISIS might very well decide that going after U.S. and Western targets is vital to its own defense.

Over the next few days, President Obama will get a menu of options from his national security advisers about how to respond to the Syria-Iraq civil war. Perhaps the best that can be hoped is that the United States opts to launch a major diplomatic offensive, in concert with Western Europe, Russia, and other countries, to work with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to stabilize the region and roll back ISIS and its allies.

If so, the United States might find willing partners in both Tehran and Riyadh. Last week, the first extended U.S.-Iran diplomatic contacts in more than 30 years took place in advance of the next round of talks, next week, between Iran and the P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear program. Whether that can help set the stage for U.S.-Iranian cooperation over Iraq remains to be seen, but there is a powerful common interest in both Washington and Tehran in halting ISIS’ advance. Indeed, officials in both the United States and Iran have expressed an interest in working together in regard to Iraq.

Meanwhile, despite the hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran, of late there have been significant signs that both sides may want to bury the hatchets. President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have recently expressed the desire to rebuild relations with Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and there are talks underway to arrange a visit by Zarif to Saudi Arabia. In another sign of Iran’s outreach to the Sunni states, Rouhani just completed an important visit to Turkey. And Oman, a Sunni Arab monarchy at the head of the Persian Gulf, has already played a crucial role as an intermediary between Iran and the United States, helping to arrange secret meetings between Washington and Tehran before the latest round of Iran-P5+1 talks got underway in 2013. If it does nothing else, the United States ought to encourage the emerging Tehran-Riyadh contacts.

Still, diplomacy often moves slowly, and wars quickly. In Iraq, after the Maliki government recovers from its shock, it is likely to launch an armed counteroffensive that will probably not distinguish between ISIS, its allies, other Sunni forces, and civilians. Maliki has already called on Shiite militias to mobilize for war, and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s preeminent Shiite cleric, has essentially called for jihad against ISIS. There are widespread reports, though unconfirmed, that Iran’s IRGC is already involved in the war, and Tehran has mobilized forces along the Iran-Iraq border. One American official, noting the irony, said that any use of U.S. air power in Iraq would end up providing cover for Iran’s Quds Force, the IRGC’s foreign intelligence arm, in Iraq. Like the war in Syria, the war in Iraq could get a lot uglier fast.